Discussion in 'New York' started by OCharley, Aug 14, 2001.

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  1. OCharley


    Just kidding... but if you need a really good laugh about lawyers, read on;
    147 F.Supp.2d 668 (S.D.Tex.2001)

    Before proceeding further, the Court notes that this case involves two extremely likable lawyers, who have together delivered some of the most amateurish pleadings ever to cross the hallowed causeway into Galveston, an effort which leads the Court to surmise but one plausible explanation. Both attorneys have obviously entered into a secret pact--complete with hats, handshakes and cryptic words--to draft their pleadings entirely in crayon on the back sides of gravy-stained paper place mats, in the hope that the Court
    would be so charmed by their child-like efforts that their utter dearth of legal authorities in their briefing would go unnoticed. Whatever actually occurred, the Court is now faced with the daunting task of deciphering their
    submissions. With Big Chief tablet readied, thick black pencil in hand, and a devil-may-care laugh in the face of death, life on the razor's edge sense of exhilaration, the Court begins.
    Defendant begins the descent into Alice's Wonderland by submitting a Motion that relies upon only one legal authority. The Motion cites a Fifth Circuit case which stands for the whopping proposition that a federal court sitting in Texas applies the Texas statutes of limitations to certain state and federal law claims. See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1021 n. 1 (5th Cir.1998). That is all well and good--the Court is quite fond of the Erie
    doctrine; indeed there is talk of little else around both the Canal and this Court's water cooler. Defendant, however, does not even cite to Erie, but to a mere successor case, and further fails to even begin to analyze why the Court should approach the shores of Erie. Finally, Defendant does not even provide a cite to its desired Texas limitation statute. A more bumbling
    approach is difficult to conceive--but wait folks, There's More!


    Plaintiff responds to this deft, yet minimalist analytical wizardry with an equally gossamer wisp of an argument, although Plaintiff does at least cite the federal limitations provision applicable to maritime tort claims. See 46 U.S.C. ยง 763a. Naturally, Plaintiff also neglects to provide any analysis whatsoever of why his claim versus Defendant Phillips is a maritime action. Instead, Plaintiff "cites" to a single case from the Fourth Circuit. Plaintiff's citation, however, points to a nonexistent Volume "1886" of the Federal Reporter *671 Third Edition and neglects to provide a pinpoint
    citation for what, after being located, turned out to be a forty-page decision. Ultimately, to the Court's dismay after reviewing the opinion, it stands simply for the bombshell proposition that torts committed on
    navigable waters (in this case an alleged defamation committed by the controversial G. Gordon Liddy aboard a cruise ship at sea) require the application of general maritime rather than state tort law. See Wells v.
    Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 524 (4th Cir.1999) (What the ...)?! The Court cannot even begin to comprehend why this case was selected for reference. It is almost as if Plaintiff's counsel chose the opinion by throwing long range darts at the Federal Reporter (remarkably enough hitting a nonexistent volume!). And though the Court often gives great heed to dicta from courts
    as far flung as those of Manitoba, it finds this case unpersuasive. There is nothing in Plaintiff's cited case about ingress or egress between a vessel and a dock, although counsel must have been thinking that Mr. Liddy
    must have had both ingress and egress from the cruise ship at some docking facility, before uttering his fateful words.


    Despite the continued shortcomings of Plaintiff's supplemental submission,
    the Court commends Plaintiff for his vastly improved choice of crayon--Brick
    Red is much easier on the eyes than Goldenrod, and stands out much better
    amidst the mustard splotched about Plaintiff's briefing. But at the end of
    the day, even if you put a calico dress on it and call it Florence, a pig is
    still a pig.

    Take heed and be suitably awed, oh boys and girls--the Court was able to
    state the issue and its resolution in one paragraph ... despite dozens of
    pages of gibberish from the parties to the contrary!

    After this remarkably long walk on a short legal pier, having received no
    useful guidance whatever from either party, the Court has endeavored,
    primarily based upon its affection for both counsel, but also out of its own
    sense of morbid curiosity, to resolve what it perceived to be the legal
    issue presented. Despite the waste of perfectly good crayon seen in both
    parties' briefing (and the inexplicable odor of wet dog emanating from such)
    the Court believes it has satisfactorily resolved this matter. Defendant's
    Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

    At this juncture, Plaintiff retains, albeit seemingly to his befuddlement
    and/or consternation, a maritime law cause of action versus his alleged
    Jones Act employer, Defendant Unity Marine Corporation, Inc. However, it is
    well known around these parts that Unity Marine's lawyer is equally likable
    and has been writing crisply in ink since the second grade. Some
    old-timers even spin yarns of an ability to type. The Court cannot speak to
    the veracity of such loose talk, but out of caution, the Court suggests
    that Plaintiff's lovable counsel had best upgrade to a nice shiny No. 2
    pencil or at least sharpen what's left of the stubs of his crayons for what
    remains of this heart- stopping, spine-tingling action.